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Introduction
China controlled this vast Central Asian steppe and  mountain region for more than two centuries until  the overthrow of the Qing dynasty in 1911, and then
again from 1919 to 1921, when Soviet-backed Marxists suc-
cessfully rebelled against Chinese rule. Following three years
of nominal rule by Buddhist lamas, the Mongolian People’s Rev-
olutionary Party (MPRP) formed a single-party Communist
state in 1924. For the next 65 years, the Soviet Union con-
trolled Mongolia’s politics and economy. In December 1989,
a group of academics and students defied the regime by form-
ing the opposition Mongolian Democratic Union (MDU). In
early 1990, the MDU formed the country’s first opposition
political party, the Mongolian Democratic Party. The govern-
ment amended the constitution in May 1990 to end the
MPRP’s status as the sole legal political party following a se-
ries of MDU-organized street protests and hunger strikes.
Mongolia held multiparty legislative elections in 1992 and
1996, and multiparty presidential elections in 1993 and 1997.
Incumbents lost power in the 1996 legislative elections, and
in both presidential elections. Legislative elections are due
to be held by June 2000.
The MPRP lost parliamentary power for the first time in
72 years in the 1996 legislative elections. The new govern-
ment overhauled the tax code, decontrolled prices, and ac-
celerated the privatization process. By mid-1999, the gov-
ernment had privatized nearly all small-scale and medium-
size enterprises and had made progress toward its goal of
selling off 60 percent of large state enterprises by the end of
2000. Mongolia’s economy is heavily dependent on raw
material exports and thus is vulnerable to external shocks.
Falling world commodity prices and the regional financial
crisis that began in 1997 contributed to sharply lower ex-
port revenues, an increase in the fiscal deficit, and a further
deterioration of an already weak banking system.
Democratization
POLITICAL PROCESS  2.75/7
1.  When did national legislative elections occur?
Were they free and fair?  How were they judged by
domestic and international election monitoring or-
ganizations?  Who composes the government?
In Mongolia’s first post-Communist legislative elections in
July 1990, the MPRP took 357 of 430 seats in the Great Hural
(parliament) against an unprepared, under-funded opposi-
tion. The MPRP also captured 33 of 53 seats in a newly-
created Little Hural elected by party preference balloting.
The 1992 post-Communist constitution created a uni-
cameral 76-member parliament. In the June 1992 legisla-
tive elections, which featured a 91 percent voter turnout,
the MPRP won 70 seats; the reform-oriented Democratic
Coalition, 4; the Western European-influenced Social Demo-
cratic Party, 1; and an MPRP-affiliated independent, 1. De-
spite winning few seats under the first-past-the-post sys-
tem, the opposition won a credible 43 percent of the popu-
lar vote. The U.S.-based International Republican Institute
noted that the electoral districts favored the rural areas,
where the MPRP drew its bedrock support, and that the
MPRP enjoyed ample funding, control over printing equip-
ment and newsprint, and sufficient stocks of gasoline to cam-
paign in the vast countryside.
In March 1996, the two leading parties in the opposition
Democratic Coalition—the Mongolian National Democratic
Party (NDP) and the Mongolian Social Democratic Party
(SDP)— led the formation of a new, four-party opposition
Democratic Union Coalition (DUC).  The DUC ran a well-
organized, issues-oriented campaign during Mongolia’s sec-
ond multiparty legislative elections in June 1996.  With a 91
percent turnout, years amid a severe energy crisis, rising prices,
and high unemployment, the DUC captured 50 seats to sweep
the MPRP from parliamentary power for the first time in 72
years. The MPRP won 25 seats. The International Republi-
can Institute reported that the main opposition parties had
made considerable progress in closing the gap on the MPRP
in terms of access to the media and resources. This was de-
spite the fact that, earlier in the year, the MPRP-led govern-
ment had changed the electoral law to provide public funds
to the election campaigns of existing parties in proportion to
the number of parliamentary seats each held. The MPRP re-
ceived nearly 92 percent of the funds under this system.
In mid-1996, the constitutional court ruled that MPs
could not hold cabinet positions. Following the June 1996
parliamentary elections, Premier Mendsaihan Enkhsaikhan
of the SDP complied with the court ruling by forming a
government composed of technocrats rather than MPs. In
April 1998, a parliamentary resolution laid the groundwork
for MPs to hold cabinet positions. The NDP, the larger of
the two main coalition partners and an advocate of slower
Nations in Transit
466
reforms, forced Enksaikhan’s government to resign and in-
stalled one of its own members, Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj, as pre-
mier. In July, parliament ousted Elbegdorj’s three-month-old
government over allegations that the government had sold off
a bankrupt state bank to cover up corrupt transactions. In the
ensuing months, president Bagabandy exercised his constitu-
tional power to reject several replacement candidates nomi-
nated by parliament.
On October 2, 1998, parliament nominated Sanjaasuren
Zorig, the leading figure in the 1990 pro-democracy movement,
to be prime minister. Bagabandy approved the nomination.
The same day, unknown assailants murdered Zorig in his
Ulaanbaatar apartment. On December 9, parliament confirmed
Bagabandy’s nomination of Janlavin Naran–tsatsralt, the
Ulaanbaatar mayor, as premier.
2.  When did presidential elections occur?  Were they
free and fair?
In 1990, an MPRP-dominated parliament appointed
Punsalmaagiyn Orchirbat to the newly created post of state
president for what was expected to be a five-year term. How-
ever, the 1992 constitution called for the president to be di-
rectly-elected for a four-year term, necessitating Mongolia’s first
direct, multiparty presidential election in 1993. The constitu-
tion gave the president the power to veto parliamentary deci-
sions (subject to two-thirds override) and nominate the prime
minister in consultation with the largest party or coalition in
parliament.  The president also serves as commander-in-chief
of the armed forces.
In April 1993, the MPRP dropped Orchirbat as its can-
didate for the upcoming presidential election in favor of
Lodongiyn Tudev, the hardline-Communist editor of the
party organ Unen (Truth). The opposition Democratic Coa-
lition subsequently named Orchirbat as its candidate.  In
the June 1993 election, held with a 90 percent turnout,
Orchirbat won 57.8 percent of the vote to defeat Tudev, who
won 38.7 percent.
Some 85 percent of registered voters turned out for the
country’s second multi-party presidential elections on May
18, 1997. The MPRP’s Nachagyn Bagabandy, a former par-
liamentary chairman, won 60.8 percent of the vote against
Orchirbat’s 29.8 percent in the context of widespread voter
concern over hardships caused by the DUC government’s
free market reforms. Zhambyn Gombozad, the candidate of
the small Mongolian Traditional Unification Party, won the
remainder. Both the 1993 and 1997 presidential elections
were free and fair, and each resulted in a decisive opposi-
tion victory.
3.  Is the electoral system multiparty-based?  Are there
at least two viable political parties functioning at all
levels of government?
There are at least two viable political parties at all levels of
government. In 1996, the MPRP-controlled parliament defeated
an electoral reform bill that would have replaced the first-past-
the-post system with proportional representation in legislative
elections. Parliament also amended the electoral law to trans-
form the 26 multi-member constituencies into 76 single-seat
districts. The majoritarian, single-member system has made it
difficult for small parties to win seats. Only four parties won
seats in the 1996 parliamentary elections.
4.  How many parties have been legalized?  Have any
parties been banned or declared illegal?
Mongolia has 17 registered political parties. Eleven parties con-
tested the June 1996 parliamentary elections and four won
seats. The government has not banned any political parties.
5.  What proportion of the population belongs to politi-
cal parties?  What proportion of party membership is
made up of women?
Although voter turnout has been high in post-Communist
elections, few Mongolians belong to political parties. In a
country with 1.15 million eligible voters, even the largest
parties have only several thousand members. There are no
data on the proportion of party membership made up of
women. However, female representation in politics is low.
As of the end of 1998, women held just 8 of 76 seats in
parliament. In December 1998, parliament approved the
appointment of the first female foreign minister, but over-
all, few women hold senior government positions. Several
female-based NGOs have actively campaigned for greater
female representation in politics.
6.  What has been the trend of voter turnout at munici-
pal, provincial, and national levels in recent years?  What
are the data related to female voter participation?
Voter turnouts for parliamentary elections were 91 percent
in 1992 and 91 percent in 1996. The 1993 and 1997 presi-
dential elections had turnouts of 90 percent and 85 per-
cent, respectively.  Turnout has been high even though most
rural voters had to travel considerable distances to reach a
polling station. Local election turnouts are considerably
lower, with a high of 64.2 percent in 1996. Although no data
is available on the proportion of voters who are female, the
high overall turnout for national elections suggests that
women vote in considerable numbers.
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CIVIL SOCIETY  3.25/7
1.  How many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
have come into existence since 1988?  What is the
number of charitable/nonprofit organizations?  Are
there locally led efforts to increase philanthropy and
volunteerism?  What proportion of the population is
active in private voluntary activity (from polling data)?
What are some of the major women’s nongovernmen-
tal organizations and what is the size of their mem-
bership?
Mongolians have formed dozens of NGOs in recent years,
including some charitable organizations. NGOs work in a
range of areas, including public policy advocacy, democratic
governance, voter education, legal advocacy, gender equity,
human rights, and social welfare. Few NGOs are working
directly to increase philanthropy and volunteerism.
There is no precise data on the proportion of the popu-
lation that is active in private voluntary activity. Given the
difficulties in coordinating private activity in a large, sparsely-
populated country with poor communications systems, and
the economic hardship that characterizes daily life for most
Mongolians, it is likely that only a relatively small number
of people are involved in NGO activities. According to the
United States Department of State, at the end of 1998
Mongolia had approximately 36 female-based NGOs work-
ing on maternal and children’s health care, domestic vio-
lence, equal opportunity, and related issues. Other female-
led NGOs worked to increase the role of women in admin-
istrative and policy making positions and to influence pub-
lic policy on women’s issues. For example, the Women’s
Federation, an NGO with branches in all of the aimag (pro-
vincial) capitals, played a key role in placing micro-credit
schemes and other women’s development programs on the
government’s poverty alleviation agenda. The Women for
Social Progress Movement, which is also represented
throughout the country, implemented a highly successful
voter-education project between 1994 and 1997. It has con-
tinued to conduct research, monitor government perfor-
mance, and carry out public education programs on demo-
cratic governance, gender equity, and other issues.
2.  What is the legal and regulatory environment for
NGOs (i.e., ease of registration, legal rights, govern-
ment regulation, taxation, procurement, and access-
to-information issues)?  To what extent is NGO activ-
ism focused on improving the legal and regulatory
environment?
The NGO registration process is relatively straightforward.
The legal and regulatory systems are generally favorable
toward civic groups. NGO activity involving legal issues usu-
ally involves educating citizens about their rights rather than
trying to improve the legal and regulatory environment.
3.  What is the organizational capacity of NGOs?  Do
management structures clearly delineate authority
and responsibility?  Is information available on NGO
management issues in the native language?  Is there
a core of experienced practitioners/trainers to serve
as consultants or mentors to less developed organi-
zations?
The organizational capacity of NGOs is limited. Most NGOs
operate with relatively small staffs, and only a few, such as
the Women’s Federation, have more than a local presence.
Most NGOs have a board of directors, and their staffs of-
ten include an executive director, a program coordinator,
and a public relations officer.  There is a small, but grow-
ing, body of literature on NGO management issues in the
Mongolian language. Foreign NGOs have provided con-
siderable expertise and training to their Mongolian coun-
terparts. Only a few NGOs have the resources to serve as
consultants or mentors to less-developed organizations.
The Ulaanbaatar-based Liberal Women’s Brain Pool
(LEOS) is running an NGO Capacity Building and Insti-
tution Project supported by the Washington-based National
Endowment for Democracy. LEOS and several other NGOs
also conduct training-for-trainers seminars on women in
development and other issues.  In 1998, an NGO called
the Center for Citizenship Education began a program to
educate NGOs about their legal status, conduct manage-
ment workshops, and provide manuals, handbooks, and
information to other NGOs.
4.  Are NGOs financially viable?  What is their tax
status?  Are they obliged to and do they typically dis-
close revenue sources?  Do government procurement
opportunities exist for private, not-for-profit provid-
ers of services?  Are NGOs able to earn income or
collect cost-recovery fees?
Most NGOs are not financially viable, and depend in
large part on foreign support. By law, NGOs are tax-
exempt. There are no specific barriers to government
procurement opportunities for NGOs although, over-
all, procurement procedures in Mongolia are often
complex and opaque. NGOs are permitted to earn in-
come and collect cost-recovery fees. Many earn rev-
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enue by teaching sewing, typing, or other skills at be-
low-market rates.
5.  Are there free trade unions?  How many workers
and what proportion of the workforce belong to these
unions?  Is the number of workers belonging to trade
unions growing or decreasing?  What is the numeri-
cal/proportional membership of farmer’s groups,
small business associations, etc.?
The constitution guarantees workers the right to join inde-
pendent trade unions.  In practice, unions are free from
government control. Workers have the right to strike, ex-
cept for those in industries that the government defines as
essential, such as law enforcement and transportation. Col-
lective bargaining is also legal, but in practice employers
usually set wages.
Union officials estimate that more than 400,000 workers
belong to trade unions, or about half the workforce. This
figure is decreasing as large state enterprises are phased
out and more workers become self-employed or work at
small, non-unionized firms. The largest federation is the
Mongolian Trade Unions Confederation.  The Association
of Free Trade Unions is also relatively strong. The Mongo-
lian Trade and Industry Promotion Agency and other asso-
ciations represent small businesses.
6.  What forms of interest group participation in poli-
tics are legal?  What types of interest groups are ac-
tive in the political and policy process?
There are no legal restrictions on the participation of
interest groups in politics. In recent years student
groups participated in the political process through
public demonstrations, hunger strikes, petitions, and
media appearances. NGOs are also involved in politics
through lobbying, voter education campaigns, distri-
bution of party manifestos, and occasional public opin-
ion polling. Female-led NGOs have placed numerous
issues on the policy agenda and have sought to increase
female participation in politics. Nevertheless, after cen-
turies of feudalism and seven decades of Soviet-style
governance, the idea that ordinary people can partici-
pate in politics is novel. Moreover, because of the
country’s limited communications systems and low
population density, grassroots activism is particularly
difficult and expensive to organize.
7.  How is the not-for-profit/NGO sector perceived
by the public and government officials?  What is the
nature of media coverage of NGOs?  To what extent
do government officials engage with NGOs?  Is the
government receptive to NGO policy advocacy?
While it is difficult to measure public attitudes toward NGOs
in Mongolia, there is little evidence of any negative attitudes
or hostility toward civic groups. Moreover, the public has
reacted positively to the work of many individual NGOs.
For example, polls showed that 20 percent of the electorate
reported benefiting from the 1996 pre-election civic educa-
tion programs of the Ulaanbaatar-based Women for Social
Progress organization. Some old-style politicians are suspi-
cious of the growing influence of NGOs but, in general,
politicians and government officials tolerate and are often
receptive to NGO activity. NGOs actively use radio to de-
liver their messages, and newspapers often carry materials
prepared by NGOs. The 1993 Law on the Government of
Mongolia directs the government to cooperate with NGOs
on the protection of human rights, although in practice there
is little formal cooperation in this area.
INDEPENDENT MEDIA  3.00/7
1.  Are there legal protections for press freedom?
The Constitution guarantees freedoms of press, speech, and
expression.  The government respects these freedoms in
practice.  In 1998, parliament adopted a media law that bans
censorship of parliamentary legislation and publicly-avail-
able information, and also bans future legislation that would
limit the freedom to publish and broadcast.
2.  Are there legal penalties for libeling officials?  Are
there legal penalties for “irresponsible” journalism?
Have these laws been enforced to harass journalists?
Under Mongolia’s libel laws, it is relatively easy for public
officials and other plaintiffs to prove harm. Journalists must
pay costs even if they win a lawsuit. There are no legal pen-
alties for “irresponsible” journalism. Since 1990, the gov-
ernment has not used the courts to harass journalists.
3.  What proportion of the media is privatized?  What
are the major private newspapers, television stations,
and radio stations?
In January 1999, a law came into effect banning state own-
ership of the print media. The government declared its two
daily newspapers, People’s Right and Government News, to be
nominally independent pending their actual sale. The law
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also required the new owners of former state-owned news-
papers to change the papers’ names for at least five years. In
February 1999, a court sided with an association of inde-
pendent publishers in ruling that while the larger of the
two state-run dailies, the former People’s Right, had changed
its name to comply with the letter of the law, it had illegally
solicited subscriptions and advertising using the People’s
Right name. By mid-1999, the government had still not sold
the two state-owned daily newspapers.
In early 1999, Mongolia had 648 registered newspapers
and periodicals, most of them private.  Because of funding
constraints, however, most publish irregularly and infre-
quently.  Most political parties have at least one newspaper,
although few parties have the resources to distribute their
papers widely.
The 1999 media law required that state-owned televi-
sion, radio, and wire services be pooled under a self-fund-
ing national public broadcasting system. By mid-1999, par-
liament had not decided how to implement the law. The
state-owned Mongolian Radio is the most important source
of information in rural areas, although private radio ser-
vices are also available. The state-owned Mongolian Televi-
sion runs the largest television service, although private
operators also run several smaller stations.  Several private
companies offer cable television in Ulaanbaatar. Mongolians
can also access foreign services via commercial satellite and
cable television systems.
4.  Are the private media financially viable?
Hundreds of private newspapers emerged following the 1990
democratic revolution, although most lacked proper fund-
ing and folded. Until the mid-1990s, most newspapers gen-
erally bartered goods for newsprint. Nearly all had to rent
printing capacity, when available, from a sole, aging, gov-
ernment-owned press housed in the building of the then-
ruling MPRP’s daily newspaper in Ulaanbaatar. All newspa-
pers now buy newsprint directly from private vendors, and
supply is no longer a problem. However, most newspapers
lack a sufficient advertising base to publish regularly. This
is particularly true for newspapers (and radio stations) out-
side Ulaanbaatar, which tend to be dependent on funding
and advertising revenue from local governments.
5.  Are the media editorially independent?  Are the
media’s news gathering functions affected by inter-
ference from government or private owners?
Mongolian newspapers and magazines are editorially in-
dependent of the government and represent a wide range
of views. Political parties own several periodicals, which
reflect party views. The privately-owned FM radio sta-
tions are primarily geared toward entertainment and pro-
vide little news. The state-run broadcast media offer many
views, but coverage occasionally favors the ruling party.
In recent years, incoming governments often replaced the
directors of the state media with their supporters. The
1999 media law committed the government to transform-
ing the state broadcast media into an independent, pub-
licly-owned system, and it remains to be seen if this will
be enough to depoliticize management and provide more
balanced coverage.
There are few constraints on the media’s newsgathering
function, although independent media sometimes complain
of unequal access to government information and officials.
Following the October 1998 murder of S. Zorig, a leading
politician, the justice ministry prohibited newspapers from
publishing stories about the case. Authorities did not sanc-
tion newspapers that defied the ban. In April 1999, unknown
assailants attacked and seriously injured L. Munkhbayasgalan,
a crime reporter for the private weekly Seruulag (Alarm Clock),
in Ulaanbaatar. Munkhbayasgalan had been covering the trial
of a politician accused of the attempted rape of another
Seruulag journalist.
6.  Is the distribution for newspapers privately or gov-
ernmentally controlled?
Private firms distribute newspapers. In some remote areas
the availability of newspapers is ultimately dependent on
the efficiency of the postal service.
7.  What proportion of the population is connected
to the Internet?  Are there any restrictions on Internet
access to private citizens?
The first Mongolian Internet connection was established in
1995. Mongolia now has several thousand Internet users,
mainly in Ulaanbaatar. The state places no restrictions on
Internet access for private citizens.
8.  What are the major press and journalists’ associa-
tions?  What proportion of their membership is made
up of women?
Major press associations include the United Alliance of
Mongolian Journalists, the Mongolian Journalists’ Union,
and the Mongolia Free and Democratic Journalists.  The
Danish-funded Press Institute of Mongolia funds training
and other programs for journalists. No data exists on the
proportion of the membership of these organizations that
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is made up of women, although women do play active roles
in these groups.
9.  What has been the trend in press freedom as
measured by Freedom House’s Survey of Press
Freedom ?
Freedom House’s Survey of Press Freedom has rated the
Mongolian press as Partly Free since 1990.
GOVERNANCE AND
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION  3.50/7
1.  Is the legislature the effective rule-making in-
stitution?
Under the 1992 constitution, the legislature is the effec-
tive rule-making institution, and this is respected in prac-
tice.  The president nominates the prime minister, who
comes from the party or coalition holding the largest num-
ber of seats in parliament and who must be approved by
parliament.  Under the constitution, a presidential veto
of legislation can be overridden by a two-thirds majority
of parliament. Since the opposition DUC coalition came
to power in the 1996 legislative elections, parliament has
become a forum for vigorous debate. That said, parlia-
ment and government agencies have failed in many cases
to develop implementing regulations for laws.  This la-
cuna grants government officials disproportionate lati-
tude in interpreting and implementing laws.
2.  Is substantial power decentralized to subnational
levels of government?  What specific authority do
subnational levels have?
The constitution reserves to the provinces powers not
specifically granted to the central government. The 1993
Law on the Government of Mongolia establishes the in-
dependence of local government bodies, but also in-
structs the central government to “provide centralized
management” of the activities of the provincial and
municipal governors. Local hurals, or legislatures, have
legislative responsibilities at the provincial, county, and
district levels. The two largest areas of local government
responsibility are education and healthcare. Local gov-
ernments are also responsible for local government ad-
ministration, capital spending, cultural affairs, environ-
mental protection, and other areas. However, power is
still relatively centralized and most decision making is
still in the hands of the central government.
3.  Are subnational officials chosen in free and fair
elections?
Mongolia is divided into 18 aimags (provinces), plus the
capital city of Ulaanbaatar and two other municipalities,
Darhan and Erdenet.  The aimags are subdivided into
390 soums (counties), which are further subdivided into
districts. The legislative bodies at the aimag, municipal
(Ulaanbaatar, Darhan, and Erdenet), soum, and district
levels are elected. There is no evidence to suggest that
these elections are not free and fair. The prime minister
appoints governors of the aimags and the municipalities
from among candidates nominated by these local legis-
lative bodies. In the October 1996 aimag and municipal
elections, the MPRP won 14 of 21 legislatures.
4.  Do the executive and legislative bodies operate
openly and with transparency?  Is draft legislation
easily accessible to the media and the public?
Between 1990 and 1996, elected MPRP parliaments op-
erated with limited transparency, held some debates in
secrecy, and did not as a rule make voting records and
floor statements available to the public. Since 1996, DUC-
led governments have operated with considerably more
transparency. Draft legislation is freely accessible to the
media and the public.
5.  Do municipal governments have sufficient rev-
enues to carry out their duties?  Do municipal gov-
ernments have control of their own local budgets?
Do they raise revenues autonomously or from the
central state budget?
Mongolia’s fiscal system is highly centralized, although
the central government, the aimags, and the soums all
have independent budgets. According to the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF), in 1997, the central
government’s share of total government revenue was 77
percent, and its share of total government expenditures
(excluding transfers to local governments) was 71 per-
cent. Each year provincial governments submit budget
requests to the Ministry of Finance (MOF).  The MOF
then calculates budgetary transfers to each province,
based largely on the previous year’s expenditure and
price increases. Parliament then approves the state bud-
get, which includes the transfers to provincial govern-
ments. Under this system, the provinces tend to under-
estimate their revenue capacities, overestimate their ex-
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penditure needs, and overspend. Overall, the process is
not transparent. In 1998, the central government pro-
vided transfer payments to all 22 provincial governments,
although some governments were more successful in
raising their own revenue than others. Four provinces
raised revenues equal to less than 20 percent of their
expenditures, while 4 provinces financed more than 90
percent of their expenditures through their own rev-
enues. Local governments often lack sufficient revenues
to carry out their responsibilities, particularly in capital
expenditure.
Tax revenues are assigned either to the central or lo-
cal government depending on whom the taxpayer is.
Large state-owned enterprises and all commercial banks
usually pay taxes to the central budget, while other en-
terprises pay taxes to local administrations. According to
the IMF, most of the revenue assigned to local budgets
consists of minor taxes and non-tax revenues. This sys-
tem, a holdover from the Soviet era, also results in an
uneven distribution of local revenues.  Most private in-
dustrial enterprises, which are major taxpayers, are con-
centrated in only a few cities and aimags.  In 1997, the
richest aimag had a per capita revenue nine times higher
than that of the poorest.  The government is considering
plans to reform the system.
6.  Do the elected local leaders and local civil ser-
vants know how to manage municipal governments
effectively?
Local officials lack sufficient human resources and ex-
pertise to manage municipal governments and deliver
services effectively.  Accounting and auditing systems
are key areas that need to be strengthened.
7.  When did the constitutional/legislative changes
on local power come into effect?  Has there been
reform of the civil service code/system?  Are local
civil servants employees of the local or central gov-
ernment?
The 1992 constitution delineated the current division of
power between the federal and local governments. Au-
thorities have not carried out a sweeping overhaul of the
civil service system, although DUC-led governments have
reduced the number of government ministries, agencies,
and civil servants.  Local civil servants are nominally em-
ployees of local governments, although in practice the
central government often pays their salaries.
Rule of Law
CONSTITUTIONAL, LEGISLATIVE,
AND JUDICIAL FRAMEWORK  3.50/7
1.  Is there a post-Communist constitution?  How does
the judicial system interpret and enforce the consti-
tution?  Are there specific examples of judicial enforce-
ment of the constitution in the last year?
Mongolia adopted its post-Communist constitution in Janu-
ary 1992. The constitution, and the Law on the Constitutional
Court, established an independent, nine-member constitu-
tional court with the power to interpret the constitution and
rule on the constitutionality of laws, decrees, treaties, national
referenda, decisions by the central electoral authority, and
other decisions by the president, government, and parliament.
While the court has not had the opportunity to issue deci-
sions on crucial constitutional issues, on lesser matters it has
established itself as an independent arbiter. For example, in
mid-1996, the constitutional court ruled that MPs could not
hold cabinet positions. Following the June 1996 elections,
the new prime minister complied with the ruling by naming
a cabinet of unelected technocrats.
2.  Does the constitutional framework provide for
human rights?  Do the human rights include busi-
ness and property rights?
The constitution prohibits torture and other abuses; pro-
vides protection against arbitrary searches, arrest, and de-
tention; and guarantees the right to a fair trial with due pro-
cess guarantees. The constitution also guarantees freedoms
of speech and press; freedoms of assembly and association;
freedom of religion; freedom of internal travel and emigra-
tion; and the right to privacy.
The constitution recognizes and protects “the right to
fair acquisition, possession, and inheritance of moveable
and immovable property,” and prohibits “illegal confisca-
tion and requisitioning of the private property of citizens.”
In addition, the 1994 civil code explicitly recognizes the right
to hold and transfer private property.
3.  Has there been basic reform of the criminal code/
criminal law?  Who authorizes searches and issues
warrants?  Are suspects and prisoners beaten or
abused?  Are there excessive delays in the criminal
justice system?
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Basic post-Communist reforms of the criminal code insti-
tuted greater protection for suspects, although the govern-
ment has not fully codified constitutional protections against
arbitrary arrest and detention. Prosecutors must issue war-
rants for searches and authorize detention of suspects if
charges are not brought within 72 hours, or for shorter peri-
ods of detention if the police did not actually witness the
crime.
Police and prison officials reportedly sometimes beat
or abuse detainees and prisoners.  Prison conditions are
poor and rising crime rates have caused severe overcrowd-
ing in detention facilities and prisons.  According to offi-
cial statistics, of 1,523 prisoner deaths between 1993 and
1998, 1,300 died of tuberculosis and other illnesses and
151 from starvation. The 1998 total of 242 prisoner deaths
(including some from natural causes) represented 4 per-
cent of the prison population of 6,172. Many prisoners enter
prison already ill or severely malnourished because of the
appalling conditions in police detention. Authorities have
introduced several prison reform measures including or-
dering food from private companies to improve its quality,
improving living conditions, retraining guards, and increas-
ing prison staff. Authorities have also ended the practice
of shaving prisoners’ heads and forcing them to stand at
attention before officials. However, prisoners are gener-
ally unaware of their rights, and some local authorities have
not fully implemented the new laws and procedures. De-
lays in the criminal justice system are not excessive, al-
though pre-trial detention is occasionally lengthy.
4.  Do most judges rule fairly and impartially? Do
many remain from the Communist era?
There is little evidence to suggest that judges do not rule
fairly and impartially. The constitution stipulates that sus-
pects are innocent until proven guilty, guarantees the right
to a public trial, and provides protections against self-in-
crimination. These due process rights are respected in prac-
tice. According to the U.S. Department of State, in 1998
Mongolian citizens made approximately 25 complaints
about the judiciary to the local office of the United Na-
tions High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR).
Most of the complaints were about corruption.  The
UNHCHR referred the complaints to NGOs and the Min-
istry of Justice.  Judges are nominated by the General Coun-
cil of Courts, an independent administrative body, and are
approved by the president.  Most judges either served dur-
ing the Communist era or received their legal education
before 1989.
5.  Are the courts free of political control and influ-
ence?  Are the courts linked directly to the Ministry
of Justice or any other executive body?
The constitution provides for an independent judiciary and
this is respected in practice.  The judiciary receives its bud-
getary allowance directly from parliament and is not linked
directly to the Ministry of Justice or any other executive body.
The post-Communist State Law of the Courts establishes
the judicial structure and sets out mechanisms to ensure
judicial independence. The regular court system consists of
a Supreme Court, provincial courts, the capital district court,
county courts, inter-county courts, and district courts.  A
12-member General Council of Courts includes the chief
justice of the Supreme Court, the state general prosecutor,
the justice minister, and several sitting judges, and serves as
a judicial independence watchdog. The General Council
nominates judicial candidates for presidential approval;
submits proposals on the required number of court per-
sonnel and on the remuneration of judges; submits a draft
budget for the judiciary to parliament; and operates a judi-
cial discipline committee. Supreme Court and lower court
judges are appointed by the president for six-year terms
and can be dismissed on the recommendation of the Gen-
eral Council under the terms specified in the State Law of
Courts. The constitutional court has three members nomi-
nated by parliament, three by the president, and three by
the Supreme Court, all of whom serve six-year terms.
6.  What proportion of lawyers is in private practice?
How does this compare with previous years?  How
many new lawyers are produced by the country’s sys-
tem of higher education?  What proportion of law-
yers and judges are women?
Although there are no accurate figures, anecdotal evidence
suggests that most lawyers are now in private practice. There
is also no accurate data on the number of new lawyers pro-
duced each year. Anecdotal evidence suggest that most law-
yers and judges are men, although women are increasingly
entering the legal profession.
7.  Does the state provide public defenders?
The constitution guarantees citizens the right of legal assis-
tance. In practice, suspects and defendants have access to
an attorney at all stages of the legal process, and the state
provides an attorney if the defendant cannot afford one.
8.  Are there effective anti-bias/discrimination laws,
including protection of ethnic minority rights?
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The constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of
ethnicity, language, race, age, gender, social status, property,
occupation, religion, creed, or education.  The government
generally enforces these provisions.  Approximately 76 per-
cent of the population are Khalkha Mongols, with smaller
Mongol groups comprising another 13 percent. Turkic speak-
ers make up seven percent of the population, with Chinese,
Russian, and other minorities forming the remainder.  There
are few reports of discrimination against minorities.
The literacy rate for adult women is around 96 percent,
close to that of men.  In general, women have equal access
to education and are prominent in the professions, though
often at the mid-level rather than in senior positions.  Women
are also frequently involved in business start-ups.  Wages
for women, however, are lower than wages for men, and since
1989 the rate of women’s employment has fallen. Analysts
attribute the general paucity of women in high positions in
government, the judiciary, and the private sector to unoffi-
cial discrimination based on traditional norms.
 9.  Are judicial decisions effectively enforced?
There is no evidence to suggest that judicial enforcement is
a problem.
CORRUPTION  4.00/7
1.  What is the magnitude of official corruption in the
civil service?  Must an average citizen pay a bribe to a
bureaucrat in order to receive a service?  What ser-
vices are subject to bribe requests – for example, uni-
versity entrance, hospital admission, telephone instal-
lation, obtaining a license to operate a business, ap-
plying for a passport or other official documents?  What
is the average salary of civil servants at various levels?
Civil servants reportedly demand bribes to provide many
routine services including issuing licenses and permits. In
1997, the government increased the pay of the 142,000 gov-
ernment employees by about 20 percent. Previously, the
monthly salary for a typical civil servant was about $25 per
month, while a minister made about $50. Compounding
the problem, the government at times paid civil servants
several months late.
2.  Do top policy makers (the president, ministers,
vice ministers, top court justices, and heads of agen-
cies and commissions) have direct ties to businesses?
What are the legal and ethical standards for bound-
aries between public and private sector activity?  Are
they observed in practice?
Top policymakers generally do not have direct ties to busi-
nesses. Authorities have not clearly delineated the guide-
lines for appropriate conduct concerning the boundary
between public and private sector activity. In practice,
Mongolia’s corruption problems have generally involved il-
licit bribes and kickbacks to politicians and bureaucrats
rather than direct involvement in business by politicians.
3.  Do laws requiring financial disclosure and disal-
lowing conflict of interest exist?  Have publicized
anticorruption cases been pursued?  To what conclu-
sion?  Are there laws against racketeering?  Do ex-
ecutive and legislative bodies operate under audit and
investigative rules?
Existing laws on financial disclosure, conflict of interest,
and racketeering are generally inadequate and authorize
relatively minor penalties. Nevertheless, authorities have
prosecuted several anticorruption cases (see below).
4.  Have there been public opinion surveys of percep-
tion of public sector corruption conducted with the
support of reputable monitoring organizations?  What
are the principal findings and year-to-year trends?
Mongolian NGOs have generally not been active in the area of
corruption. Anecdotal evidence suggests that there is increas-
ing public discomfort with the level of official corruption.
5.  What major anticorruption initiatives have been
implemented?  How often are anticorruption laws and
decrees adopted?  Have leading government officials
at the national and local levels been investigated and
prosecuted in the past year?  Have such prosecutions
been conducted without prejudice or have they tar-
geted political opponents?
Parliament passed an anticorruption law in spring 1996, and
since then has not regularly issued other anticorruption laws
and decrees. As of mid-1999, the government was consider-
ing amending the 1996 law to increase penalties for corrup-
tion, and had announced plans to establish an independent
anticorruption commission. The State Audit Committee has
vigorously investigated several public officials for alleged
malfeasance, and courts have handed down several convic-
tions in recent years. However, the October 1998 murder of
S. Zorig, the infrastructure minister and leader of the Com-
munist-era pro-democracy movement, set off an unprec-
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edented anticorruption drive. Many Mongolians surmised
that Zorig had been murdered because of his outspoken
stand against corruption and to prevent him from exposing
details of bribery involving state contracts. In the course of
their investigation, police uncovered numerous suspect of-
ficial transactions. In April 1999, parliament stripped three
MPs of their immunity, and authorities detained two of them
for questioning regarding the alleged rigging of a casino
tender. This marked the first time any MP had been de-
tained on suspicion of corruption.
6.  Is there growing public intolerance of official cor-
ruption as measured in polls?  Are there effective
anticorruption public education efforts?
Press reports indicate that the public is increasingly out-
spoken against official corruption. Authorities have under-
taken few anticorruption public education efforts.
7.  How do corruption-ranking organizations like
Transparency International and other major corrup-
tion-ranking organizations rate this country?
Transparency International’s 1999 Corruption Perceptions
Index ranked Mongolia 43rd out of 99 countries with a score
of 4.3 (with the 99th country being the most corrupt, and 10
being the top score for least corrupt).
Economic Liberalization
PRIVATIZATION  4.25/7
1.  What percentage of the GDP comes from private
ownership?  What percentage of the labor force is
employed in the private sector?  How large is the in-
formal sector of the economy?
In 1990, which began under single-party, Communist rule,
the public sector accounted for about 90 percent of GDP.
No data is available on the percentage of GDP that comes
from private ownership, although in 1997, the latest year for
which figures are available, private consumption accounted
for 60.3 percent of GDP.
Although no data exists, anecdotal evidence suggests
that the majority of the workforce is in the private sector.
There is a large informal sector based around the tradi-
tional nomadic economy. Because free market reforms
contributed to a decline in real incomes and an increase
in unemployment rates, most herdsmen have little incen-
tive to embrace the cash economy, particularly in a no-
madic culture that has traditionally placed little emphasis
on accumulating luxury goods or commodities. Instead,
many herdsmen continue to barter. The government’s prac-
tice of informally intervening in the market to affect sup-
ply and demand has created a black market in agricultural
goods and other items.
2.  What major privatization legislation has been
passed?  What were its substantive features?
The 1991 Privatization and Companies Law linked
Mongolia’s privatization program to the development of a
capital market under a scheme in which individual citizens
would get vouchers that they could then exchange for shares
of privatized companies on the stock exchange. To initiate
the privatization process, the government distributed vouch-
ers to all citizens free of charge. Citizens could then use the
vouchers to buy shares of companies through brokerage
firms and the Mongolian Stock Exchange (MSE).  The 1996
Law on State and Local Property established the proce-
dures for valuation of property to be privatized; permissible
methods of privatization; and the modalities for carrying
out privatization by auction, trade, tender, sale of public
shares and stocks, and joint venture.
3.  What proportion of agriculture, housing and land,
industry, and small business and services is in pri-
vate hands?
The post-1990 MPRP government proceeded slowly on
privatization and suspended the process entirely in the run-
up to the 1996 legislative elections.  The DUC government
accelerated privatization and collected more total revenues
from the privatization of state-owned enterprises between
January and September 1997 than the MPRP government
collected in 1995 and 1996 combined.
Agriculture: In the early 1990s, the MPRP government
ended forced collectivization. In a country in which one-
third to two-fifths of the population are nomadic herders,
more than 97 percent of the livestock sector is now in pri-
vate hands.  Livestock numbers rose from 25 million in 1993
to 29.3 million by January 1997, the highest level in 50 years.
Housing and land: No data exist on the proportion of hous-
ing in private hands.
Industry: Large state enterprises still dominate the
agroprocessing, transport, telecommunications, mining, and
energy sectors. The government has pledged to privatize 60
percent of these entities, or more than 800 companies, by
mongolia
475
the year 2000. However, the state retains a majority stake in
many factories that are classified as privatized, and it is un-
clear to what extent the latest round of privatization will
result in fully privatized companies.
Small business and services: The government has privatized
nearly all small-scale and medium-size enterprises.
4.  What has been the extent of insider (management,
labor, and nomenklatura) participation in the
privatization process?  What explicit and implicit pref-
erences have been awarded to insiders?
The 1996 Law on State and Local Property provides mecha-
nisms for adjudicating claims of unfair practices in the
privatization process. Critics have charged authorities with
granting insider preferences in certain specific cases, al-
though there have been few suggestions that the privatization
process as a whole has been marred by widespread corrup-
tion. There is no evidence  that labor has played an insider
role in the privatization process.
5.  How much public awareness of and support for
privatization has there been?  What is the nature of
support and opposition to privatization by major in-
terest groups?
The 1996 Law on State and Local Property requires the
government to use the media to publicize information on
the shares and dividends of an entity at least 30 days before
it is to be privatized.  The government does so and the pub-
lic appears to have adequate information about the
privatization process. At the same time, many Mongolians
seem wary of privatization, which they equate with economic
decline and rising unemployment.  Most state workers ap-
parently oppose privatization, as do conservative elements
of the opposition MPRP.
MACROECONOMIC POLICY  3.75/7
1.  Has the taxation system been reformed?  What
areas have and have not been overhauled?  To what
degree are taxpayers complying?  Is tax compliance
difficult to achieve?  Has the level of revenues in-
creased?  Is the revenue-collection body overbur-
dened?  What is the overall tax burden?
The 1992 General Law on Taxation defined the post-Com-
munist tax system, the role of the State Tax Administration
and tax inspectors, and the rights, obligations, and respon-
sibilities of taxpayers.  The 1992 Personal Income Tax Law
delineated the country’s income tax system.  Prior to 1997,
Mongolia’s tax system consisted mainly of the enterprise
income tax, individual income taxes, sales taxes, excise taxes,
and customs duties. The system was characterized by com-
plex rate structures, narrow tax bases, and large loopholes.
In 1997, the government introduced major changes that
reduced the number of corporate income tax rates from 4
to 2 (15 percent and 40 percent); reduced the number of
individual income taxes from 5 to 3 (10, 20, and 40 percent);
broadened the sales tax to include enterprises in the food,
construction, and communication sectors; eliminated all
customs duties except on alcoholic spirits; doubled the ex-
cises on petroleum products, wine, and spirits; and reduced
the royalty rate on minerals.  The government also increased
government fees to improve cost recovery. There is no evi-
dence to suggest that tax compliance has been a significant
problem.
Mongolia’s dependence on commodities exports makes
its economy highly vulnerable to external shocks. By 1996,
decreases in world prices for copper and other commodi-
ties caused tax receipts from commodities exporters to fall
sharply. The regional financial crisis that began in 1997 re-
duced demand for Mongolian exports and further depressed
already low commodity prices. This external shock sharply
reduced tax revenues. In July 1998, the government intro-
duced a 10 percent Value Added Tax to replace the existing
sales tax, but in the face of declining tax revenues increased
the VAT to 13 percent in August and increased the excise
tax on petroleum products. In mid-1999, the government
was considering additional revenue measures including a
broad-based import duty at 5 percent and an excise tax on
beer.
In 1992, the government established the General Depart-
ment of National Taxation (GDNT) to handle tax collection and
administration. In 1998 and 1999, the GDNT made progress in
simplifying and computerizing the tax administration system
and proceeded with taxpayer registration, but overall, the sys-
tem continued to be overburdened and understaffed. In 1998,
revenue as a share of GDP was 26 percent.
2.  Does fiscal policy encourage private savings, in-
vestment, and earnings? Has there been any reform,
alteration of revenue and budget policies?  How large
are budget deficits and overall debt?  Is the financ-
ing of the social insurance/pension system sustain-
able?  What proportion of the budget is taken up by
subsidies to firms and individuals?
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Mongolia’s fiscal policy generally encourages private sav-
ings, investment, and earnings. In 1996, the DUC govern-
ment came into office promising to balance the state bud-
get, but world copper prices plunged 33 percent, wiping
out nearly one-quarter of state revenues. In July 1997, the
IMF granted a new, three year, $45 million Enhanced Struc-
tural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) to replace an ESAF it had
suspended under the previous government. During the
course of the year, the government removed most import
duties, but this reduced revenues by about 2.5 percent of
GDP and ultimately the government had to raise new ex-
cises and duties.
In 1998, the regional financial crisis resulted in sharply
reduced demand and further depressed prices for
Mongolia’s major export commodities—copper, gold, and
cashmere—causing a deterioration of the fiscal and exter-
nal accounts and costing the country roughly 9 percent of
GDP. Copper alone had accounted for 15 percent of tax rev-
enue in 1997. Major taxpayers including the giant Erdenet
copper mine, which used to be the largest taxpayer in
Mongolia, reported huge losses for the year, and corporate
tax payments to the government fell sharply. Moreover, pay-
ments arrears by Erdenet and other enterprises to the Cen-
tral Energy System (CES) and other utilities prevented some
utilities from meeting their full tax obligations, and prompted
the government to extend a costly emergency loan to the
CES. Excise tax revenue also decreased due to a sharp de-
cline in oil imports from Russia.  The government responded
by raising new levies, decreasing capital expenditures, and
borrowing from domestic banks to cover revenue shortfalls.
However, the trade shock, the central bank’s efforts to main-
tain the stability of the exchange rate (which further ham-
pered exports), and higher government expenditures on
goods, services, and wages, contributed to an increase in
the fiscal deficit from 8.6 percent of GDP in 1997 to 11.2
percent in 1998. In early 1999, the fiscal position worsened
because of the continuing slump in commodity prices and
increased expenditures to support bank restructuring and
settle domestic and external arrears incurred in 1998.
In 1998 and 1999, Mongolia continued to require aid from
the donor community to build up adequate foreign exchange
reserves and finance public investment. The ratio of gov-
ernment debt to GDP was 55 percent in 1997, and increased
to 59 percent in 1998. The ratio of total debt to GDP fell
from 74.7 percent in 1997 to 70.9 percent in 1998. The ratio
of total debt service to exports fell from 9.3 percent in 1997
to 6.2 percent in 1998. External debt accounted for nearly
90 percent of total debt. About half of the external debt is in
long-term obligations to international financial institutions.
There is also a substantial unresolved transferable ruble
claim held by Russia relating to Mongolia’s transactions with
the former Soviet Union.
The social insurance/pension system is not sustainable
(see Social Sector). In 1998, subsidies and transfers
amounted to 6.3 percent of GDP.
3.  Has there been banking reform?  Is the central
bank independent?  What are its responsibilities?  Is
it effective in setting and/or implementing monetary
policy? What is the actual state of the private bank-
ing sector?  Does it conform to international stan-
dards?  Are depositors protected?
The 1991 Banking Law established the legal basis for bank-
ing activities in post-Communist Mongolia. The law did not
create an independent central bank; instead it charged the
Bank of Mongolia (BOM) with “implementing the govern–
ment’s monetary policy.” The BOM’s activities include con-
trolling the money supply; intervening in the foreign ex-
change market and taking other measures to insure the sta-
bility of the currency; managing official foreign reserves;
determining capital adequacy ratios for banks; setting in-
terest rates; acting as a lender of last resort to commercial
banks; clearing interbank settlements; and licensing, regu-
lating, and supervising commercial banks.
The BOM has adopted relatively tight credit and mon-
etary policies, but inflation is still a problem.  The post-Com-
munist MPRP government brought inflation down from 325
percent in 1992 to a still high 53 percent in 1995. But in
1996, higher energy prices and a 26 percent expansion in
the money supply contributed to a 59 percent inflation rate.
Thereafter, successive governments maintained a tight mon-
etary policy, bringing inflation down to 6.5 percent at the
end of 1998. The principle instrument of monetary policy is
the interest rate on central bank bills.
The banking sector does not conform to international
standards. In 1996, the incoming DUC government faced a
severe liquidity crisis in the banking sector and in Decem-
ber shut down two large, bankrupt state banks (which to-
gether accounted for nearly 50 percent of the banking
system’s total assets). Authorities also established two new
government-owned banks and a debt recovery agency. In
addition, the BOM formalized understandings with indi-
vidual banks on monthly credit ceilings and minimum re-
serve requirements.
In 1998, the regional financial crisis contributed to a fur-
ther deterioration of a banking system that, according to
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the IMF and World Bank, was already weakened by defi-
cient management, poor internal controls, inadequate en-
forcement of prudential requirments, delayed supervisory
intervention, and inadequate legal, regulatory, and account-
ing frameworks. By mid-year, the country’s banks were in
crisis, with noncompliance with prudential requirements
increasing, capital positions weakening, insolvencies deep-
ening, profitability declining, and the stock of nonperforming
loans increasing. At the end of August 1998, nonperforming
loans totaled 41.5 percent of total outstanding loans, and 5
banks, representing about 30 percent of banking system
assets, were insolvent. Authorities declared the Reconstruc-
tion Bank to be insolvent after a failed merger only three
months earlier with the private Golomt Bank. The Recon-
struction Bank had been the fourth largest bank and the
largest provider of financial services to the government and
to public enterprises. Its insolvency eroded confidence in
the banking system.
In September 1998, the government amended the Bank-
ing Law to increase the minimum capital requirement and
empower the BOM to ensure better bank management and
financial disclosure. Notably, the amended law established
a legal basis for bank audit standards. The BOM took steps
to strengthen the prudential regulation of banks through
changes in loan classification, accounting, and bookkeep-
ing standards, and in methods for calculating risk, risk man-
agement practices, and liquidation criteria.
According to the IMF, the interbank money market is
weak due to the illiquidity and insolvency of major banks,
mistrust among banks, and the absence of an appropri-
ate operating framework. As of mid-1998, the banking
sector consisted of 18 commercial banks, with 100
branches, 394 sub-branches, and 33 savings points. Four
banks account for 76 percent of bank assets.  The govern-
ment fully owns three banks that comprise 62 percent of
total bank assets, and is a minority owner of 5 banks com-
prising 28 percent of total assets. There is no system for
protecting depositors.
4.  How sound is the national currency? Is the value
of the currency fixed or does it float?  How convert-
ible is the currency?  How large are the hard cur-
rency reserves?  Has the exchange rate been stable
and predictable?
In 1993, the government permitted the tugrik to float.  The
tugrik is fully convertible on the current account. The for-
eign exchange market consists of an interbank market and
an informal cash market.
Government policies and external shocks contributed
to a 50 percent depreciation in the  nominal exchange rate
between 1996 and 1999. After the DUC government took
power in 1996, it decontrolled most prices and adopted
other radical free-market measures that contributed to
higher inflation and a decrease in the value of the tugrik.
In late 1997, parliament passed monetary policy guidelines
for 1998 requiring the BOM to maintain the exchange rate
within a five percent range of the end-1997 level. The re-
gional financial crisis, however, caused a drop in world
prices for copper and other key exports, which reduced
foreign exchange revenues and caused the exchange rate
to depreciate. The BOM intervened heavily in the foreign
exchange market in an effort to adhere to the parliamen-
tary guidelines, in the process further drawing down for-
eign reserves. By the end of 1998, gross international re-
serves had fallen to $121 million, or 11.5 weeks of import
cover, despite an inflow of concessional external finance.
The BOM eventually ceased its intervention in the foreign
exchange market, and the exchange rate fell from 817
tugriks to the U.S. dollar in mid-1998 to 915 per dollar by
the end of 1998. By mid-1999, the tugrik traded at more
than 1,000 to the dollar.
5.  Is there a functioning capital market infrastruc-
ture? Are there existing or planned commodities,
bond, and stock markets? What are the mechanisms
for investment and lending?  What government bod-
ies have authority to regulate capital markets?
The government created the Mongolian Stock Exchange
(MSE) in 1991. In its first operational phase, from Febru-
ary 1992 to August 1995, the MSE allowed individual citi-
zens to buy shares in newly privatized companies.  In Au-
gust 1995, the MSE began trading shares like a regular
bourse. As of mid-1998, the MSE listed 430 firms, with a
market capitalization of $53 million and a daily turnover
of $15 million in 1997. Payment settlements have been af-
fected by the banking sector’s liquidity problems. Com-
modities markets are small and rudimentary. The govern-
ment sells treasury bonds, treasury bills, and central bank
bills. However, secondary markets are thin. The govern-
ment plans to develop the interbank money market, intro-
duce regular treasury bill auctions, and convert non-ne-
gotiable bank restructuring bonds into marketable securi-
ties. In 1994, parliament passed the Securities Law, which
established the legal framework for regulating securities
exchanges and set up the Securities Commission to regu-
late securities firms and the stock exchange.
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MICROECONOMIC POLICY  3.75/7
1.  Are property rights guaranteed? Are there both
formal and de facto protections of private real es-
tate and intellectual property?  Is there a land reg-
istry with the authority and capability to ensure ac-
curate recording of who owns what?  What are the
procedures for expropriation, including measures
for compensation and challenge?  Have any seizures
taken place?
The constitution guarantees private property rights, includ-
ing intellectual property.  The 1994 civil code also explic-
itly recognizes private property and intellectual property,
and guarantees the right to possess, use, and dispose of
property.  Mongolia is a member of the World Intellectual
Property Organization and has acceded to its treaties. In
1993, parliament passed patent and copyright laws. In 1997,
the government allowed housing privatization for the first
time. The civil code and the 1996 Law on State and Local
Property required the government to establish a land reg-
istry, and authorities complied. The 1996 law also instructed
provincial governors to take an inventory and keep a gen-
eral registry of local property, and most have apparently
complied.
The civil code permits the government to expropriate
land on the grounds of “special public need,” with the re-
quirement that authorities grant a one-year notice and
compensate the owner. Unless otherwise provided by law
or contract, the compensation must cover the price of land,
immovable property on the land, and expenses. The owner
has the right to challenge an expropriation or compensa-
tion package in court. There are no reports of illegal sei-
zures or expropriations of land or other property.
2.  To what extent have prices been liberalized?  What
subsidies remain?
The MPRP government began liberalizing prices in 1992.
In 1996, the DUC government abolished the Price Con-
sensus Commission, which had informally set prices for
some basic commodities, and fully liberalized most prices.
In 1997, the government eliminated remaining price con-
trols on electricity, heating, water, and rent.  Nevertheless,
the government continued to use commodity purchasing
decisions and other informal means to influence market
prices.  The government also continued to set power and
heating tariffs, but raised them significantly and established
an automatic increase mechanism to offset the effects of
inflation and currency fluctuations.
3.  Is it possible to own and operate a business? Has
there been legislation regarding the formation, dis-
solution, and transfer of businesses, and is the law
respected?  Do there exist overly cumbersome bureau-
cratic hurdles that effectively hinder the ability to
own and dispose of a business?  Are citizens given
access to information on commercial law?  Is the law
applied fairly?  Do regulation or licensing require-
ments impose significant costs on business and con-
sumers?  Do they create significant barriers to entry
and seriously hamper competition?
The post-Communist Bankruptcy Law established legal
procedures for declaring companies bankrupt, dissolving
them, and protecting their creditors. Although the Bank-
ruptcy Law and commercial laws are respected, the bureau-
cracy still retains many Communist-era officials who have
resisted the free-market system. As such, entrepreneurs are
sometimes hampered by informal bureaucratic interference
in commercial operations. The actual procedures for own-
ing and operating a business involve fairly straightforward
registration and licensing requirements.
Urban citizens have access to commercial law, although
such access is more difficult across the vast rural expanses.
Commercial law appears to be applied fairly. According to
an “Investment Climate Statement, 1999,” prepared by the
U.S. Department of Commerce, Mongolia’s regulatory sys-
tem “lacks experience and enforcement capability. The sys-
tem is transparent in the sense that copies of the laws are
readily available...and officials do try to live up to the spirit
and letter of the legislation as written.” Regulation and li-
censing requirements appear to be reasonably straightfor-
ward and neither impose significant costs nor create sig-
nificant barriers to entry or hamper competition.
4.  Are courts effective, transparent, efficient, and
quick in reaching decisions on property and contract
disputes? What alternative mechanisms for adjudi-
cating disputes exist?
Although Mongolian courts generally adjudicate property
and contract disputes in a fair and transparent manner, the
court system is still rudimentary and often inefficient.  As
such, there are often delays in resolving commercial cases.
5.  Is business competition encouraged? Are monopo-
listic practices limited in law and in practice?  If so,
how? To what degree is “insider” dealing a hindrance
to open competition?  Are government procurement
policies open and unbiased?
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The post-Communist Law on Prohibiting Unfair Competi-
tion prohibits the government from restricting economic
competition, prohibits most monopolies and other restraints
on fair competition, establishes guidelines for government
intervention to ensure fair competition and to regulate natu-
ral monopolies, and establishes the role of the courts in
determining an entity to be a monopoly and handing down
legal remedies.  There is no evidence that insider dealing is
a significant hindrance to open competition.  Government
procurement policies are complex and often opaque.  An
International Monetary Fund-sponsored program is pro-
moting transparency and accountability in procurement by
assisting officials in drafting and upgrading regulations and
procedures for procurement of goods, civil works and re-
lated services, and infrastructure projects.
6.  To what extent has international trade been liber-
alized?  To what degree has there been simplifica-
tion/overhaul of customs and tariff procedures, and
are these applied fairly?  What informal trade barri-
ers exist?
In 1991, the Soviet Union and its former satellites accounted
for 99 percent of Mongolia’s imports and 94 percent of its
exports.  By 1997, trade with Russia and the former East
Bloc countries accounted for only about half of Mongolia’s
total trade volume, with China, South Korea, and Japan ac-
counting for much of the rest. Trade with Russia is con-
ducted partially on a barter basis, including the use of Mon-
golian commodities to repay debts.
The post-Communist Customs Law established a uni-
fied system of customs duties and fees, as well as mecha-
nisms for trade supervision and customs enforcement. The
government began liberalizing tariffs in 1992, and in 1997,
the reformist government took the radical measure of elimi-
nating tariffs and taxes on all imports, except on alcoholic
spirits.  However, this move reduced revenues by about 2.5
percent of GDP, and along with the decline in commodity
revenues, forced the government to raise new sources of
revenue. In August 1998, the government imposed a $7 per
ton excise on petroleum products, and in September au-
thorities introduced seasonal duties on flour and vegetables.
The government may also re-introduce a uniform tariff.
There are no significant nontariff barriers.
Smuggling has contributed to a serious loss of state rev-
enue. In mid-1997, the government imposed a tax on raw
cashmere and camel wool exports. According to the Far
Eastern Economic Review, in 1998 reported cashmere exports
fell by more than 98 percent, which suggests that most of
Mongolia’s raw cashmere is apparently being smuggled out
of the country.
7.  To what extent has foreign investment and capital
flow been encouraged or constrained?
The 1993 Foreign Investment Law has a stated aim of en-
couraging foreign investment and establishes guidelines for
protecting the rights and property of foreign investors in
Mongolia.  The law permits foreign investors to establish
fully-owned companies, dispose of property, and repatriate
investments and profits. The law also explicitly bars nation-
alization or illegal expropriation of foreign-owned assets. In
addition, the law guarantees equal treatment for Mongolian
and foreign-owned companies. The government has encour-
aged foreign investment, particularly to exploit the country’s
vast reserves of oil, copper, gold, fluorspar, and other miner-
als. Foreigners cannot own land but may enter into leasing
arrangements. According to the U.S. Department of State,
the main barriers to greater foreign investment include an
inadequate energy system and infrastructure, legal and regu-
latory deficiencies, petty corruption, and a small domestic
market.
Mongolia acceded to the IMF’s Article VIII in February
1996. In 1999, the World Bank observed that, “the exchange
rate system is free of restrictions on current international
payments and transfers.”
8.  Has there been reform of the energy sector? To
what degree has the energy sector been restructured?
Is the energy sector more varied, and is it open to
private competition?  Is the country overly depen-
dent on one or two countries for energy, including
whether exported fuels must pass through one or
more countries to reach markets?
Authorities have carried out limited energy sector reforms.
The state-owned Energy Authority (EA) controls power sup-
ply and distribution, although the government has signaled
its interest in allowing private sector participation. Payments
arrears by large enterprises to utilities continued to be a key
problem.
As recently as 1996, Mongolia imported 99 percent of its
oil from Russia.  In recent years, there have been cuts in
electricity service in some areas of Mongolia because of
shortages in Russia of mazut, a low-boiling fuel oil imported
for use by some coal-fired power stations.  Foreign compa-
nies have begun developing domestic oilfields, which hold
an estimated 6 billion barrels of reserves and should even-
tually reduce, if not eliminate, this dependence on Russia.
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Energy exports must go either through Russia or China.
Mongolia exports to Russia some of the five million tons of
coal it produces each year.  In 1998, Mongolia exported its
first crude oil to China, via trucks.
Social Sector Indicators
1.  What is the size of the national workforce? What
proportion of the workforce is employed on a full time
basis?  What are the labor force participation rates
for adult non-retirement age women and men?  What
is the overall official and unofficial unemployment
rate and what is the unemployment rate for men and
women?  Does the state provide unemployment com-
pensation; if so, how is it calculated and how long is
it paid?  What proportion of the median wage does
unemployment compensation constitute?
In 1998, Mongolia had a labor force of 859,300 workers,
which included 350,000 herders and more than 100,000 in-
dustrial sector workers. Some 809,500 workers were em-
ployed on a full-time basis. The labor force participation
rate was 68.0 percent.
The loss of Soviet subsidies and Council for Mutual Eco-
nomic Assistance export markets; the ensuing collapse of
the centrally planned economy; and the more recent clo-
sure and privatization of state-owned enterprises, have all
contributed to significant increases in unemployment. As
of March 1999, 48,913 workers were registered as unem-
ployed, but the actual number of unemployed workers is
believed to be far higher. The official unemployment rate is
5.8 percent; 6.4 percent for men and 5.2 percent for women.
The burdens of restructuring have fallen disproportionately
on women, who are often the first to be laid off. Moreover,
women have fewer employment opportunities than men out-
side the state sector.
2.  Describe the national pension and retirement sys-
tem.  Describe public sector and private pension sys-
tems.  Provide data on government pension benefits
and indicate the proportion of retirees covered by
pensions. What is the retirement age for men and
women?  What is the average monthly retirement
benefit and what proportion of the median wage does
it constitute?  Is there a system of specialized ben-
efits for specific groups (for example, the disabled or
certain groups like Chernobyl victims)?
Mongolia’s social insurance system consists of the Pension
Insurance Fund, Benefits Insurance Fund, Work Injury Fund,
Unemployment Insurance Fund, and Health Insurance Fund.
Under the 1995 Social Insurance Law, employers and em-
ployees are required to make contributions to these funds,
with a total contribution rate of 29 to 31 percent of employee
wages. In 1997, the government allowed farmers, herdsmen,
and private businessmen to enter the social insurance sys-
tem, which formerly only covered people listed on govern-
ment and private payrolls. The Pension Insurance Fund is
the largest component of the system and operates on a pay-
as-you-go basis, with contribution rates of 13.5 percent for
employers and 5.5 percent for employees in the private sec-
tor. Government employees contribute 1.1 percent of wages,
and the government contributes 17.9 percent. For the self-
employed, participation in the pension system is voluntary
and the contribution rate is 9.5 percent.
The retirement age is 60 for men and 45 to 55 for women,
depending on years of service and number of children.
Currently, the minimum pension is equivalent to the mini-
mum wage. In 1999, the World Bank noted that, “the high
and erratic inflation rates, plus the absence of automatic
adjustments of pension benefits for changes in prices or
average wage rates, make the link tenuous between contri-
butions and benefits, and limit the incentives to contrib-
ute.” There are large contribution arrears to the Pension
Fund, and the base for pension contributions is narrow rela-
tive to the coverage of pension recipients. In May 1999, the
Far Eastern Economic Review reported that the government
was often paying pensions months overdue. The United
States Agency for International Development is helping the
government reform the pension system by introducing na-
tionally defined individual accounts. This is designed to es-
tablish a closer link between paid contributions and ben-
efit accruals, offer a better benefit structure for controlling
future pension costs, and create a basis for the future tran-
sition towards a partially funded system. The transition to a
fully funded system is not feasible in the near-term.
In 1998, social security expenditures amounted to 6.2
percent of GDP. Mongolians who do not participate in the
pension system and who live under the minimum living stan-
dard fall under the Social Assistance Law and receive 50 per-
cent of the minimum living standard as a social pension. There
are specialized benefits for handicapped persons, the disabled,
mothers with large families, and war veterans.
3.  What is the country’s average and median monthly
income in local currency and dollar equivalents?
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What has been the trend in average and median
monthly incomes since 1993?  Are there major prob-
lems in wage arrearages?  If yes, describe their extent
and scale, providing some detail related to the sec-
tors of the economy in which arrearages are most
pronounced.  Describe how people compensate for
cash arrearages (for example, barter).  What are the
differences in public and private sector median wages
and in median wages among men and women?
In 1998, GNP per capita was $400. No data is available on
the trend in average and monthly median incomes since
1993. Wage arrearages are not a major problem. Wage levels
and other employment issues are decided in tripartite ne-
gotiations between employer, union, and government rep-
resentatives.  In practice, employers generally set wages. The
legal minimum wage is approximately $14 per month, which
is generally applied to simple manual labor. There is no ac-
curate data on the difference between public and private
sector median wages, and on the difference in median wages
among men and women.
4.  What has been the annual size of the elementary,
secondary, and post-secondary education school popu-
lation since 1993?  What is the proportion of 8-18 year-
olds enrolled in the educational system and what has
been the trend since 1993?  What is the national stu-
dent-to-teacher ratio?  Provide basic data on public
spending for education since 1993: what is the pro-
portion of GDP expended on education by the state,
and how has this proportion changed since 1993?
As of the end of 1997, Mongolia had 645 primary and sec-
ondary schools with 435,000 students, and 125 higher and
vocational institutions with 63,000 students. The government
provides children with free, compulsory education through
the age of 16. Until 1990, Mongolia had close to universal
coverage of basic education. However, the country’s transi-
tion to a market economy has reduced enrollment, particu-
larly in rural areas. Most importantly, the privatization of live-
stock increased the demand for male child labor and many
male children left school. In 1997, the enrollment rate for
primary and secondary schools stood at about 88 percent,
with the rates being 86 percent for males and 91 percent for
females. In 1997, the national student-teacher ratio was 24:1,
although in some rural areas the ratio was 10 to 15:1. As part
of an “Education Sector Development Program” supported
by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the government plans
to increase the student-teacher ratio in many rural areas and
achieve a national average ratio of 30:1.
Education spending by the state amounted to 5.8 percent
of GDP in 1993 and 5.5 percent of GDP in 1998. Twenty per-
cent of the education budget goes to heating. In 1999, the
government failed at times to pay teachers’ salaries. Funding
for education is the joint responsibility of the central and
local governments. The extent of government expenditures
varies with local fiscal resources. According to the World Bank,
for the five richest provinces/cities, the central government
provides no transfers to local budgets. For the poorest prov-
inces, the central government provides almost the entire edu-
cation budget. As of 1999, funding is based on several quan-
tifiable variables, including the number of students, to en-
courage schools to increase enrollment rates, reduce redun-
dant workers, and increase wages for teachers.  There is a
severe shortage of teaching materials at all levels.
5.  Provide data on infant mortality, birth rates, life
expectancy (both male and female), divorce rates, and
suicide rates, and trends over recent years in these
spheres.
Mongolia’s health indicators worsened after the start of the
transition period and only began recovering in 1994. Ac-
cording to the World Bank and the UNDP, infant mortality
per 1,000 live births fell from 62 in 1992 to 35.3 in 1998. In
1998, life expectancy at birth was 64.3 years; 67.7 years for
women and 61.1 years for men. No data is available on di-
vorce and suicide rates.
6.  Provide data on the ratio of doctors and nurses to
the population.  What is the trend in average and me-
dian monthly wages for doctors, nurses, and medics
since 1993?  Provide data on the number of hospital
beds and on the number of hospital beds per capita.
Provide statistics on the percentage of GDP devoted
to health care.  Provide data on the proportion of GDP
expended by the public sector on health care.
Mongolia had 26 physicians per 10,000 persons in 1996.
No data is available on the trend in average wages for
healthcare providers since 1993, although in general these
professionals receive relatively low wages. There are 9.9
hospital beds per 1,000 persons. Health insurance premi-
ums amount to 6 percent of wages, and are shared 50-50
by employers and employees. Premiums cover about 60
percent of health expenditure. In early 1998, the govern-
ment approved a “Health Sector Development Program,”
supported by the ADB, which aims to strengthen primary
health care, encourage private sector participation in health
service delivery, rationalize health care staffing levels, and
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upgrade staff qualifications. Healthcare spending by the
state amounted to 3.8 percent of GDP in 1993 and 9.4
percent of GDP in 1998. Twelve percent of the health
budget goes to heating.
7.  What are official and authoritative nongovern-
mental data concerning the scale of poverty and
poverty rates?  What is the poverty rate among
males, females, and the elderly and pensioners?
Provide trends in poverty rates since 1993.
The collapse of Mongolia’s centrally planned economy
and more recent economic shocks associated with the
regional financial crisis contributed to an increase in
poverty rates. A survey released in April 1999 showed that
35.6 percent of the population lived in poverty in 1998,
down only slightly from 36.3 percent in 1995. Poverty is
marginally higher in urban areas. The number of urban
poor rose to 39.3 percent from 38.8 percent in 1995. In
rural areas, the percentage fell to 32.7 percent in 1998
from 33.1 percent in 1995. The World Bank notes that,
“Despite the efficiency gains associated with privatization,
particularly in light of subsequent consolidation of herds,
it has led to greater rural income inequality and
marginalization of small herders.”
Poverty has had a particularly severe impact on female-
headed households. According to the World Bank’s 1996
poverty assessment, women headed 18 percent of all
households in Mongolia. Nearly 60 percent of individu-
als living in female-headed households are poor, as com-
pared to 31 percent in male-headed households. Female
heads of households tend to have less education and own
fewer herding animals per capita than their male coun-
terparts, and female-headed households tend to have
fewer employed household members but an equal num-
ber of children relative to male-headed households. With
external support, the government has initiated income
generation programs targeting women in particular. Ur-
ban areas also have several thousand street children.
There are no data on poverty rates among the elderly
and pensioners.
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